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. . . . As all six men were blind, neither of them could see the whole elephant and approached the 
elephant from different directions.  After encountering the elephant, each man proclaimed in 
turn:  
'O my brothers,' the first man at once cried out, 'it is as sure as I am wise that this elephant is 
like a great mud wall baked hard in the sun.'  
'Now, my brothers,' the second man exclaimed with a cry of dawning recognition, 'I can tell you 
what shape this elephant is - he is exactly like a spear.' . . . 
'Why, dear brothers, do you not see,' said the third man -- 'this elephant is very much like a 
rope,' he shouted.  
'Ha, I thought as much,' the fourth man declared excitedly, 'This elephant much resembles a 
serpent.'  . . . 
'Good gracious, brothers,' the fifth man called out, 'even a blind man can see what shape the 
elephant resembles most.  Why he's mightily like a fan.'  
At last, it was the turn of the sixth old fellow and he proclaimed,  
'This sturdy pillar, brothers' mine, feels exactly like the trunk of a great areca palm tree.'** 
For much of the twentieth century, the state’s position with respect to marriage and other 
relationships between adults sparked little conversation in legal and political theory.  Instead, the 
state’s role in putting its seal of approval on marital relationships and discouraging other 
relationships between adults was generally taken as an unquestioned fact.  To the extent that the 
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2state’s position on relationships between adults was raised at all, commentary centered on the 
relative ease with which persons generally, or particular classes of persons could be married or 
divorced,1 or the consequences of divorce.2 The legitimacy of the state’s involvement in and 
support for marriage, itself, however, went largely undiscussed. 
Recent legal, political and social events, however, have turned this state of affairs on its 
head.  The string of court decisions finding merit in same-sex marriage challenges, beginning 
with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin in 1994,3 and extending through the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,4 to 
 
1 For example, in the period between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, a great number of law review articles focused on 
the then occurring no-fault divorce revolution sweeping the states.  See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of 
California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291 (1987); Thomas B. Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault 
Requirement, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 543 (1989); Balancing Children’s Rights Into the Divorce Decision, 13 VT. L. 
REV. 531 (1989); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987); Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to 
Develop in Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 493 (1987). 
 
A considerable amount of the literature on marriage and divorce during the 1980s and early 1990s also 
focused on the right of members of particular groups to marry.  Prison inmates were one of the groups that received 
the most attention.  See, e.g., Bradford L. Thomas, Restricting State Prisoners’ Due Process Rights: The Supreme 
Court Demonstrates Its Loyalty to Judicial Restraint, 22 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 215 (1991); Jacqueline B. 
DeOliveira, Marriage, Procreation, and the Prisoner: Should Reproductive Alternatives Survive During 
Incarceration? 5 TOURO L. REV. 189 (1988); Virginia L. Hardwick, Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitutional 
Restrictions on Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 275 (1985).  The rights of those with HIV and 
AIDS to marry also provoked conversation.  See, e.g., Robert D. Goodman, In Sickness or in Health: The Right to 
Marry and the Case of HIV Antibody Testing, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 87 (1988); The Constitutional Rights of AIDS 
Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (1986). Immigrants’ rights to marry was also explored.  See, e.g., Jesse I. Santana, 
The Proverbial Catch-22: The Unconstitutionality of Section Five of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments 
of 1986, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1988/1989); Vonnell C. Tingle, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986: 
Locking In By Locking Out? 27 J. FAM. L. 733 (1988/1989); Eileen P. Lynskey, Immigration Marriage Fraud 
Amendments of 1986: Till Congress Do Us Part, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1087 (1987). 
 
2 See, e.g., Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. 
L. REV. 879 (1988); Michael Diehl, The Trust in Marital Law: Divisibility of a Beneficiary Spouse’s Interests on 
Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1986);  Michelle Dorsey Deis, Gross v. Gross: Ohio’s First Step Toward Allowing 
Private Ordering of the Marital Relationship, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 235 (1986);  Barb Mattei, Deficit Reduction Act: 
Divorce Taxation, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 177 (1986); Helen A. Boyer, Equitable Interest in Enhanced Earning 
Capacity: The Treatment of a Professional Degree at Dissolution—In Re Marriage of Washburn, 60 WASH L. REV.
431 (1985); Charles F. Basil, The Divisibility of Pension Interests on Divorce: The District of Columbia Ups the 
Ante, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1087 (1984). 
 
3 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1994). 
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3today, as well as the continuing political reaction against these decisions,5 has fomented a 
vigorous debate in legal and political theory regarding the state’s appropriate role in relationships 
between adults.  This debate has been spurred on, as well, by social developments, including the 
 
Thus far, however, despite some success in courts,  see, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44; Goodridge, 798 
N.E.2d at 941; Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (1999), only the state of Massachusetts, which began issuing 
licenses to same-sex couples on May 17, 2004, currently permits same-sex marriage.  See David W. Chen, Trenton 
Court Considers Gay Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at B8. Before Hawaii courts could strike down the 
Hawaii law prohibiting same-sex marriage, the state’s citizens amended the Hawaii Constitution to allow the 
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriage. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. Vermont legislators, meanwhile, adopted a civil 
union statute that gives members of same-sex unions the same rights as marriage, but does not permit such couples 
formally to marry.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2005).  Meanwhile, challenges to same-sex marriage bans are 
still working their way through the courts in other states, including California.  See, e.g., Lockyer v. City and County 
of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (Cal. 2004); Kerrigan v. Connecticut, No. CV044001813, 2005 WL 834296 
(Conn. Super.), 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 827 (Mar. 3, 2005); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2005); 
Castle v. Washington, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Super., Sept. 7, 2004). 
 
5 On the national level, concerns about state courts striking down same-sex marriage bans has led to the Defense of 
Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996), which declares that no state must give effect to a same-sex 
marriage celebrated in another state, and that the term “marriage” for purposes of federal law is confined to the 
union of a man and woman.  On the state level, these same concerns had caused 38 states, as of mid-2004 to adopt 
their own laws forbidding the recognition of same-sex marriage celebrated in other states, four of them in their 
respective state constitutions.  ABA Section of Family Law, Working Group on Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, 
and Domestic Partnerships 9 (2004). 
 
4increasing visibility of same-sex relationships,6 the mushrooming rates of single-parent families,7
and the growing number of couples who choose to remain childless.8
The resulting conversation among political and legal theorists has been complex.  Many 
in the conversation have argued that marriage should be extended to same-sex couples.9 Others 
have argued that the state should retain the institution of marriage, but continue to restrict it to 
 
6 The 2000 U.S. Census counted 601,209 same-sex unmarried partner households.  This means that roughly 1% of 
all couples sharing a household are same-sex.  That is a 314% increase from the 1990 Census, although changes in 
the manner of coding these responses probably led to significant undercounting in the earlier census.   It is likely that 
actual numbers are higher than even the 2000 Census reveals due to underreporting of these relationships.  See 
DAVID M. SMITH AND GARY J. GATES, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES:
SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS 2-3(2001), available at http:/www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=8425 
(last visited December 20, 2005). 
7 In 1960, nine percent of children lived in single-parent homes.  By 1999, that figure rose to 27%. STEPHANIE 
SADO AND ANGELA BAYER, POPULATION RESOURCE CENTER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE CHANGING AMERICAN 
FAMILY (2001), available at http://www.prcdc.org/summaries/family/family.html (last visited December 17, 2005). 
The rise in single-parent families is attributable not only to increased divorce rates, but to an increase in the number 
of families in which the parents were never married.  The percentage of children born out of wedlock increased at an 
accelerated pace beginning in the mid-1960s. Id. In 1970 there were about 400,000 births (out of 3.7 million total 
births) to mothers who were unmarried; in 1990, that figure rose to 1.2 million.  George Akerlof, Janet Yellen and 
Michael Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q. J. OF ECON. 277, 285 
(1996).  During the same period, married women’s fertility rate declined.  Id. Overall, almost one in every three 
families with children is headed by a woman who has never been married. KRISTEN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS:
THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCIES 103 (1996). 
8 According to the Census Bureau's 1998 Current Population Survey, a greater percentage of women of all ages are 
not having children. In that year, 5.7 million (or 18.4 percent) married women of childbearing age (defined by the 
Census as between 15 and 44 years old) were childless. Amanda Bachu and Martin O’Conner, Fertility of American 
Women, Current Population Reports, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-526.pdf. The National Center of 
Health Statistics confirms that the percentage of women of childbearing age who define themselves as voluntarily 
childless is generally on the rise: from 2.4 percent in 1982, to 4.3 percent in 1990, to 6.6 percent in 1995, to 6.2 
percent in 2002 (the most recent year for which statistics are available). That amounts to 3.83 million women who 
chose to forgo motherhood in 2002.  National Center for Health Statistics, Fertility, Family Planning, and 
Reproductive Health of U.S. Women: Data From the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, 23 Vital and Health 
Statistics 25, pg. 8 (Dec. 2005), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf.
9 See, e.g., Gregory Care, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Long Overdue: The 
Evolution of a “Sexual Orientation-Blind” Legal System in Maryland and the Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage,
35 U. BALT. L. REV. 73 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of 
Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011 (2005), and, Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A 
Step-By-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 641 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Against 
Blanket Interstate Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 17 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 205 (2005), and, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: 
The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684 (2004). 
5heterosexual couples.10 Still others, including some gay rights advocates, believe that the state 
has no legitimate business regulating adult relationships, and assert that the state should remove 
itself completely from sanctioning marriage.11 Finally, even those who agree that the state 
should support marriage disagree about the amount of financial, legal or social support that it 
should offer these relationships.12 
What explains these vastly disparate claims regarding the state’s position concerning 
relationships between adults?  And how should these very different views be resolved?   I argue 
here that commentators have reached such widely divergent results because they have tended to 
focus on too narrow a range of goods at stake in these relationships.  Relationships between 
adults, however, implicate not just one or two, but a number of principles important to a liberal 
democracy.  And, to complicate matters further, some of these principles stand in tension with 
one another.  To derive the state’s policy on relationships between adults from consideration of 
just one or two of the relevant goods at stake recalls the Indian story of the blind men who, on 
encountering an elephant, all felt different parts of the animal and emerged with radically 
different descriptions of the nature of the beast.  It is only through an approach that recognizes 
the multiplicity of goods at stake in the state’s approach to relationships between adults, and that 
 
10 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH 
AMERICA (2005). 
 
11 See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 
(2003); MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004); Judith Stacey, Toward Equal Regard For Marriage and 
Other Imperfect Intimate Affiliations, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 331 (2003). Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter 
Less: The ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353 (2004). 
 
12 Compare, e.g., Laura S. Adams, Privileging the Privileged?  Child Well-Being As a Justification for State 
Support of Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 881 (2005); William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 153 (2004); Phoebe G. Silag, To Have, to Hold, to Receive Public Assistance: TANF and Marriage 
Promotion Policies, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUSTICE 413 (2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Does Marriage Make People 
Good or Do Good People Marry? 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 889 (2005). 
 
6seeks to ameliorate the tension among these goods, that a workable approach appropriate to a 
liberal democracy can be fashioned. 
 My hope in this essay is to offer such a workable approach.  In Part I, I consider four 
prominent entries in the debate over the state’s treatment of relationships between adults.  The 
first two of these views argue that the state should eliminate civil marriage:  one of these 
arguments is from Martha Fineman, one of the foremost feminist legal scholars in the United 
States; the other is from Michael Warner, a leading queer theorist.  The other pair of entries 
argue in favor of the state retaining a privileged status for marriage:  these include William 
Galston, a widely-respected liberal theorist who also served as a domestic policy advisor for 
President Clinton; and the Council on Family Law,13 an organization chaired by Harvard Law 
School Professor Mary Ann Glendon.  I argue that each pair of theorists reaches disparate 
conclusions from the other pair because they focus on different goods important to a liberal 
democracy.  I contend that there are particular elements of each of these four positions that a 
vigorous liberal democratic polity must seek to draw upon – although others that should be 
rejected, as well.   
In Part II, I discuss the various goods and principles important to a liberal democracy 
implicated in relationships between adults.   I then lay out an approach that seeks to ameliorate 
the tension among these principles.  In this approach, the state continues to provide a civil route 
to formalize relationships among adults.  But since many types of caretaking relationships 
produce important public goods, it allows formalization of a broader range of relationships than 
the couples now permitted to marry by states.  Further this approach allows the state to provide 
some privileges to these relationships.  Because it is mindful that these privileges conflict with 
 
13 The Council on Family Law is jointly sponsored by the Institute for American Values, the Institute for Marriage 
and Public Policy, and the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law, and Culture.   
 
7other important goods, however, this approach limits the permissible extent of these privileges.  
Finally, this approach requires that the state actively seek to remedy the negative consequences 
to public goods associated with relationships among adults – particularly increased gender 
inequality; increased economic inequality; and the possibility that close caretaking relationships 
will cause their participants to turn away from civic life.   
In the closing parts of the essay, I consider two difficult issues that the state must 
confront with respect to relationships among adults.  In Part III, I discuss the form that state 
recognition of such relationships should take.  Specifically, should the state categorize all 
relationships between adults together under a banner such as “domestic partnership,” and 
therefore give the same rights and privileges to all such relationships?  Or should such 
relationships be categorized separately, and privileges accorded, to each separate type at issue?  
In the latter case, the state would presumably retain a civil status for conjugal relationships such 
as marriage, but also recognize other forms of adult-adult relationships, such as domestic 
partnerships between friends who cohabitate.  Finally, in Part IV, I consider the difficult issue of 
the extent to which the state may legitimately seek to encourage two-parent families over single-
parent families and marital relationships over other relationships between adults. 
The account that I develop in this essay is unabashedly liberal, in the sense that it 
assumes the equal worth of all human beings, the importance of limits on government, and 
respect for individual rights.14 It takes seriously, however, the recent insights of political 
theorists who argue that liberalism cannot and should not be completely neutral with respect to 
 
14 I use the term “liberal” throughout this article to refer to the Anglo-American line of political thought stretching 
from John Locke through John Stuart Mill and on to such contemporary thinkers as John Rawls, whose work 
focuses on the importance of liberty, self-government, and equal rights for citizens.  This use of the term is therefore 
broader than the use of the term “liberal” in common parlance to refer to those who hold political beliefs at the 
opposite end of the political spectrum from conservatives.  Under my use of the term, both thinkers such as John 
Rawls, who might qualify as a liberal under common usage, and Robert Nozick, who might be considered a political 
conservative, are “liberals.” 
 
8different versions of the good life, and that a liberal polity must strive to further a broader range 
of goods than the individualistic versions of liberty and justice that have often been associated 
with it.15 And it seeks to combine those insights with those of feminist theorists who have 
pointed out that the inevitability of dependency, and the consequent need for caretaking, must be 
accounted for in structuring our common lives together.16 Put another way, although a liberal 
democracy should give significant pride of place to individual liberty and justice, it must also 
pay attention to an array of other goods and principles relating to human dependency and human 
development that are necessary to a robust democracy, and which have been too often excluded 
from standard liberal accounts.17 In my view, it is only by considering this richer range of goods 
and principles that the appropriate relationship between families and the state can be brought into 
focus.   
 
15 See, e.g., WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 
(1991) (arguing that a liberal state cannot and should not be neutral with respect to all versions of the good); AMY 
GUTMANN, Undemocratic Education, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 79-80 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989) 
(stating that is “dangerous” to permit the policies of the state be dictated only according to the “best interests of its 
individual members,” and defending an alternative ideal of “collective self-determination—an ideal of citizens 
sharing in deliberate determination of the future shape of their society”); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 10 (1999) (articulating an expansive form of liberalism that “begins with the idea of the equal worth of 
human beings as such, in virtue of their basic human capacities for choice and reasoning”; THOMAS SPRAGENS,
CIVIC LIBERALISM: REFLECTIONS ON OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 150(1999); see also Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic 
Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, 105(3) ETHICS 468, 487 (1995). 
 
16 See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 54 (positing that, because dependency is an inevitable part of the human 
condition, “the political and policy questions should focus on an optimal reallocation of responsibility for 
dependency across societal institutions”); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND 
DEPENDENCY 188(1999) (arguing in favor of a social and political commitment to meet dependency needs); JOAN 
TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE 157-180 (1993) (arguing that 
dependency and “care” are fundamental parts of human life, and, consequently, that the political framework must be 
reformulated to incorporate them); Eva Feder Kittay, Taking Dependency Seriously: The Family and Medical Leave 
Act Considered in Light of the Social Organization of Dependency Work and Gender Equality, 10 HYPATIA 8, 24-25 
(1995) (emphasis in original) (“What is required is that the public understanding of social cooperation include 
respect for the importance of caring for one another and the value of receiving care and giving care.  It then becomes 
a matter of political justice for basic institutions to make provisions for and facilitate satisfactory dependency 
relations.”).  
 
17 As Charles Taylor says about modern thought generally, “[w]e have read so many goods out of our official story, 
we have buried their power so deep beneath layers of philosophical rationale, that they are in danger of stifling.  Or 
rather, since they are our goods, human goods, we are stifling.” CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE 
MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 520 (1989)(emphasis in original).  
 
9I.  Theoretical Positions in the Existing Conversation 
In the discussion over the state’s treatment of relationships between adults, recent debate 
has focused on the controversy between those who believe that the state has no business with 
respect to relationships between adults, and those who argue precisely the opposite.  In this 
section, I consider the arguments of theorists on both sides of this issue.   I argue that both sides 
point to important goods at stake in the state’s treatment of such relationships, but that these 
goods cannot be considered independently.  Instead, they must be balanced against other 
important goods and principles at stake in the state’s treatment of these relationships. 
 
A.  Fineman and Warner — The Case Against Marriage 
 
No feminist theorist has taken a stronger stance against civil marriage than Martha 
Fineman.18 Current public policy, she argues, is based on the myth that families should be 
autonomous.  Because the marital family, according to popular thought, is seen as a strong and 
independent unit, it is conceived as representing the ideal that the state should be promoting.19 
As a result of the belief that the marital form should be encouraged because it is autonomous, 
Fineman points out with irony, married couples receive hundreds, if not thousands, of subsidies 
and privileges from the state that are unavailable to other, supposedly less autonomous family 
forms.20 
18 Fineman’s views on this issue have received significant critical debate.  See, e.g.,MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, Just 
Marriage: On the Public Importance of Public Unions, in JUST MARRIAGE 14-16 (2004) (criticizing Fineman’s 
advocating a contractual approach to relationships between adults), Elizabeth Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation, and 
Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 252(2004) (responding to Fineman’s call to 
eliminate civil marriage).    
 
19 FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 57. 
 
20 Id. at 104-05.  See also TERRENCE R. DOUGHERTY, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL’Y INST., 
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE UNDER FEDERAL AND MASSACHUSETTS LAW 4-14, (2004) (listing marital 
benefits under federal and Massachusetts law), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/EconomicCosts.pdf (last visitedNovember 12, 2005).   
10
Fineman contends that this policy of supporting the marital family is misguided on 
several grounds.  First, she contends that complete autonomy is possible for no one, including 
married couples.  In contemporary society, everyone exists within a web of institutions that 
provide for at least some of their needs.  Because of this, Fineman argues, the state’s pursuit of 
autonomy should be abandoned in favor of insuring that human needs are humanely and justly 
met for all citizens, not just those who live in families.21 
Fineman also criticizes other justifications for the multitude of benefits currently awarded 
to married couples.  Insofar as the state focuses on the marital family to support childrearing, 
Fineman contends, it is sorely out-of-touch: large portions of the population raise children out of 
wedlock, while, at the same time, many married couples choose to remain childless.22 A state 
that truly seeks to support the welfare of children should therefore support childrearing in all the 
contexts in which it occurs, not just for children whose parents are married.23 And insofar as the 
state subsidizes the marital family because it represents the majority’s views of how people 
should order their lives, Fineman contends, its actions are illegitimate:  in a diverse and secular 
liberal society, the state should not privilege one form of affiliation over others simply because 
that affiliation better comports with the private morality of the majority of citizens.24 On top of 
that, Fineman points out, the state’s current support for the institution of marriage overlooks 
significant problems with that institution, most obviously that it is an institution to which (at least 
until recently, and in most places still) only heterosexual couples are admitted, and that it is rife 
 
21 FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 199, 285. 
 
22 Id. at 67, 110-112. 
 
23 Id. at xvii. 
 
24 Id. at 105. 
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with sex inequality.  On this latter point, she argues that public policy that encourages marriage 
for the sake of children demonstrates the state’s willingness to sacrifice women’s interests for 
children’s.25 
Fineman argues that instead of subsidizing a particular type of family, i.e., the marital 
family, the liberal state should subsidize the particular functions that it has a legitimate interest in 
supporting, in whatever relationships these functions take place.26 This means, for Fineman, 
that the state should not seek to further its interest in childrearing through privileging the marital 
family grouping, as it currently does; instead, it should subsidize the caretaker-dependent 
relationship directly in whatever type of configuration in which it occurs.27 In contrast, Fineman 
argues that the state has no legitimate stake in furthering relationships between capable adults.  
In her words: 
 Why create policies based on a seriously weakened family affiliation – the 
marital couple – when it is really caretaking that we as a society should want to 
ensure?  Society has a responsibility to adjust to these changing patterns of 
behavior by guaranteeing that the emerging family forms are supported in 
performing the tasks we would have them assume.28 
As a result, Fineman asserts, the state should eliminate civil marriage as a legal institution.29 In 
the new regime she proposes, legal relationships between adults would be governed by private 
 
25 Id. at 88. 
 
26 Id. at 67 (“It is time to build our family policy around these emerging norms, to focus not on form but on the 
function we want families to perform.”); see also id. at 68, 105-107 (arguing that the focus needs to shift away from 
the historic, symbolic form of the marital relationship and towards the role or function that the institution of the 
family is seeking to serve in society).  
 
27 Id. at 67; see also id. at xix, 108, 138-41. 
 
28 Id. at 67. 
 
29 See id. at 122 (“I argue that for all relevant and appropriate societal purposes, we do not need marriage and we 
should abolish it as a legal category.  I argue that we should transfer the social and economic subsidies and privilege 
that marriage now receives to a new family core connection – that of the caretaker-dependent.”).  
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contracts negotiated between them.  This would leave marriage as a purely religious institution 
for those couples who choose to enter it, with no civil consequences.   
Fineman’s view that the state should eliminate civil marriage bears a strong affinity to 
arguments made by queer theorists, most prominently, Michael Warner.  Warner contends that 
the gay community’s current push for same-sex marriage runs the risk of requiring “the 
wholesale repudiation of queer culture’s best insights on intimate relations, sex, and the politics 
of stigma.”30 He argues that the early years of the gay rights movement in the United States 
developed a vision of queer politics centered, among other things, on the recognition that a 
diverse range of sexual and intimate relationships is worthy of respect.  That movement, 
according to Warner, originally sought to develop unprecedented types of commonality and 
intimacy.  In doing so, it rejected the norms of straight culture that granted “legitimacy to some 
kinds of consensual sex but not others [and] to confer respectability on some people’s sexuality 
but not others’.”31 
This original vision of queer politics, Warner contends, is undercut by the current 
advocacy in the gay community for same-sex marriage.  Warner argues that marriage is the 
means through which the state has historically sought to privilege and promote a particular, 
monogamous model of heterosexual sexuality, and to stigmatize all other models as morally 
tainted.32 According to Warner, this represents the blatant imposition of the majority’s view of 
what is morally proper on the minority.  Warner resists the notion that the state should serve as 
an instrument of moral judgment, granting “legitimacy to some kinds of consensual sex but not 
 
30 Michael Warner, Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage, 5 GLQ: A J. OF GAY AND LESBIAN STUD. 119, 
122 (1999). 
 
31 Id. at 123. 
 
32 Id.
13
others or to confer respectability on some people’s sexuality but not others.”33 He argues that 
instead of calling for same-sex marriage, gays and others who perceive themselves as queer 
should be striving for “[t]he ability to imagine and cultivate forms of the good life that do not 
conform to the dominant pattern.”34 
B.  Galston and the Council on Family Law  – The Case for Marriage 
 
Fineman’s and Warner’s arguments against marriage stand in stark contrast to arguments 
favoring marriage from William Galston, as well as from the Council of Family Law.   In the 
context of condemning out-of-wedlock births for their negative consequences on children, 
Galston argues against the view that marriage is a failed social institution that the state should 
abandon.  In his words, marriage: 
is not a panacea, but it is a vital part of the solution. In at least a majority of cases, 
marriage can make a positive contribution, not only to the well-being of children, but also 
to the well-being of their parents. 
 
Does this represent nostalgia? Does it imply the reaffirmation of patriarchy? On the 
contrary: it means the simple recognition that for economic, emotional and 
developmental reasons, marriage is the most promising institution yet devised for raising 
children and forming caring, competent, responsible adults. . . .  I am deeply skeptical 
that the abolition of marriage, with all of its imperfections, can possibly yield better lives, 
or a better society for our children.35 
Despite Galston’s having served as domestic policy advisor for the Clinton 
administration, his view that the state should promote the marital relationship bears a significant 
resemblance to the policies advocated by the socially conservative Council on Family Law, 
although some of its rationales vary from Galston’s.  In its recent report, “The Future of Family 
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
 
35 Galston, supra note 10, at 323. 
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Law: Law and the Marriage Crisis in North America,”36 the Council argues that marriage should 
continue to be the state’s privileged institution for relationships between adults.  That report 
argues that “at its core marriage has always had something to do with societies’ recognition of 
the fundamental importance of the sexual ecology of human life: humanity is male and female, 
men and women often have sex, babies often result, and those babies, on average, seem to do 
better when their mother and father cooperate in their care.”37 This understanding of marriage as 
the promotion of a stable framework for biological parents procreating and raising children, the 
report argues, should continue to be promoted by the state.   
The report therefore decries proposals like Fineman’s and Warner’s that argue for state 
disengagement from marriage.  Such arguments, the Council asserts, sounding a chord similar to 
Galston’s, “den[y] the state’s legitimate and serious interest in marriage as our most important 
child-protecting social institution and as an institution that helps protect and sustain liberal 
democracy.”38 The Council also argues against proposals that seek to expand the category of 
relationships recognized by the state beyond married couples.  According to the Council, doing 
so would unwisely “celebrate relationship diversity” to the exclusion of fostering the important 
goals that have traditionally been supported in marriage.39 Further, to treat relationships that 
have not been formalized as the equivalent of marriage, the Council argues, would not only 
undercut couples’ own intent regarding the effects of their relationships, it would also fail to 
encourage couples to enter into formal commitments, and would therefore miss an important 
 
36 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 10.
37 Id. at 13. 
 
38 Id. at 6. 
 
39 Id. at 40. 
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opportunity for the state to encourage the stability of these relationships and the welfare of any 
children who result from them.40 
Finally, the Council also argues against expanding marriage to same-sex couples.41 To 
do so, the report contends, would “strip[] all remaining remnants of sex, gender, and 
procreativity from the public, shared meaning of marriage.”42 It would therefore, according to 
the report, fail to recognize “the specificity of marriage as a form of life struggling with the 
unique challenges of bonding sexual difference and caring for children who are the products of 
unions.”43 
C.  Assessing the State’s Interest in Horizontal Relationships 
How should we evaluate these diametrically opposed claims regarding the state’s correct 
posture toward marriage and other relationships between adults?  In my view, each of these 
positions focuses on important goods and principles that a vigorous liberal democratic polity 
 
40 Id. at 24-25. 
 
41 In doing so, the Council appears to depart from Galston’s position.  In a recent article, Galston at least implicitly 
suggests that he supports states’ freedom to expand marriage beyond its current boundaries:    
 
It remains to be seen whether the evolving constitutional jurisprudence will ultimately strike down 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage. The push for a federal constitutional amendment defining marriage as 
the union of one man and one woman reflects social conservatives' fears about just such an outcome. By 
contrast, many advocates of gay marriage would be satisfied with a state-by-state approach, which would 
inevitably yield long-term differences among the states on this matter.  The debate over the right of public 
authorities to enforce uniformity on the institutions of civil society is far less settled. I agree with [Peter] 
Schuck when he insists that "the distinction between public and private morality, between the values laws 
should mandate and those it should leave to the disparate choices of a diverse civil society, lies at the core 
of a liberal society,"  and that "the diversity that flows from the[] exercise of individual freedom is 
presumptively valid." I also agree with Schuck's application of this principle to the freedom of association: 
“[I]f valuing diversity in a liberal society means anything, it means assuring people's freedom to form 
exclusive groups that embrace unpopular beliefs in ways permitted by the Constitution and without undue 
interference by the law."  
 
William Galston, Liberal Government, Civil Society, and the Rule of Law, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 19 (2005)). 
42 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 9, at 26. 
 
43 Id. at 21. 
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should seek to draw upon.  Yet none of them steps back enough to consider the full range of 
goods and principles at stake.   
Fineman is certainly right that autonomy is possible for no one, adults as well as children, 
and that the state should abandon the quest for the pursuit of autonomy in favor of insuring that 
human needs are met with justice and dignity.  Yet, precisely contrary to Fineman, this gives the 
state an important stake in relationships between adults.44 As care theorists have made 
abundantly clear,45 and as Fineman herself argues, 46 it is not just children and those with 
disabilities who need care:  all humans need care, even generally-healthy adults. And as our 
society is organized, some large portion of that care will come, if it comes at all, from other 
adults with whom we share close relationships.  In such “horizontal” relationships,47 neither 
person is always the caretaker nor the dependent, as they are, for example, in relationships 
between adults and young children.  Instead, adult-adult relationships are, at their best, marked 
by what might be called “reciprocal dependency,” in which each partner sometimes performs 
caretaking activities for the other and meets the other’s dependency needs; in turn, their partner 
does the same for them at other times.  These relationships, when they function well, involve 
countless small acts in which each adult takes care of the other: one partner makes the other a 
 
44 See also Linda McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 414-
15(2003) (“To do [otherwise] seems to undervalue adult-adult interdependency and to miss the important facilitative 
role government may play in supporting such forms of adult affiliation”); Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 
WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 57, 60-61 (2002). 
 
45 See KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR, supra note 13; Tronto, supra note 16. 
46 See FINEMAN, supra note 10, at xvii, 35-36. 
 
47 I use the term “horizontal relationships,” to refer to relationships among generally able adults.  The term 
distinguishes these relationships from such “vertical” relationships as those between parents and children, in which 
one person is the caretaker and the other the dependent. 
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cup of coffee when they get up; the other drops off dry-cleaning on the way to work; one runs to 
the store for cold medicine when the other is sick; and so on.48 
This sort of caretaking, at its best, produces a society in which adults are knit into webs 
of care that help them to support one another.  In these webs, one partner’s cold doesn’t develop 
into something worse because the other partner insists on taking them to see a doctor.  Moreover, 
such caretaking helps keep families stable so that partners are there for one another at times 
when one of them has greater needs, such as periods of disability.  The state has an important 
interest in these relationships because of its interest in the dignity of its citizens, not to mention 
their health and well-being.   
 By the same token, Warner focuses on only a limited range of the goods at stake.  He is 
on firm ground in recognizing that the issue of relationships among adults implicates the 
important values of freedom and diversity.  He also, along with Fineman, properly recognizes 
that in a liberal democracy committed to freedom the state should not be used as a vehicle to 
promote the majority’s own comprehensive views with respect to citizens’ private lives.  Yet he 
fails to recognize the public goods that horizontal relationships implicate—including the 
caretaking that adults require, and the important value of human dignity that this furthers.   
Turning to the other side of this debate, both Galston and the Council on Family Law also 
point to important goods to which a liberal democracy must attend.  The liberal democratic state, 
as both Galston and the Council argue, should be able to privilege some relationships over others 
for public ends.  And certainly creating a stable environment for children is such an end: all other 
 
48 This is not to say that in all, or even most, horizontal relationships between women and men the carework is 
evenly divided. Studies have repeatedly shown that women spend significantly more time caretaking than men, even 
when women work outside the home.  See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING 
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME  271-78 (1989); see also Katharine Kay Baker, Taking Care of Our 
Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495, 1512 n.63 (1997).  There is some suggestion, however, that the deficit 
between men and women has been decreasing slightly.  See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 
1906-07 (2000).  
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things being equal, stable family relationships are better for children than unstable or nonexistent 
relationships.  Further, while many of the greater difficulties associated with single-parent 
families can be attributed to lack of adequate legal and social supports,49 having the emotional 
and financial resources of two loving adults available to a child, again, all other things being 
equal,50 is better than having the resources of just one.  Both Galston and the Council also make 
valuable points about the important role that the state can have through formalizing and 
privileging relationships such as marriage in creating an environment that fosters the caretaking 
of citizens generally, as well as children specifically.   
In focusing on the state’s promoting marriage (and, in the Council’s case, solely 
heterosexual marriage), however, they too narrowly define the relationships that should be 
accorded such privileges by the state.51 The Council argues that advocates who support the 
state’s awarding privileges to a broader category of relationships than marriage miss “the 
specificity of marriage as a form of life struggling with the unique challenges of bonding sexual 
difference and caring for children who are the products of unions.”52 Yet the Council gives no 
convincing reason why the disparate issues of “bonding sexual difference” and “caring for 
 
49 See, e.g., Nancy Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 19, 34-35(1995) (documenting 
ways that lack of social and economic support for single parent families creates problems). 
50 The caveat of “all other things being equal” is a significant one.  I am not arguing that having two parents who 
are unhappy stay together is better for children than having them separate.  I am making the more modest claim that, 
for a child, having two happy parents living together is generally better than having one happy parent because of the 
extra emotional, caretaking, and financial resources they can contribute.  Moreover, having two parents who live 
together happily is, all other things being equal, generally better for a child than having two parents who live happily 
apart.  See William Galston, Causes of Declining Well-Being Among U.S. Children, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND 
FAMILY 299-303 (Martha Nussbaum and David Estlund eds., 1997) (summarizing research findings).   
 
51 To be fair, while Galston argues in favor of shoring up marriage and discouraging divorce, he would extend 
other policy measures that he advocates such as making work and family more compatible, and offering tax breaks 
to many types of families, not simply families headed by a married couple. Elaine Kamarck and William Galston, 
Putting Children First: A Progressive Policy for the 1990s, in MANDATE FOR CHANGE 153 (Will Marshall and 
Martin Schram eds., 1992).  See also Galston, supra note 10, at 317-22 (arguing for a more progressive tax policy 
that better eases the burdens placed on working families).        
52 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 9, at 21.   
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children” should both be required in every marriage, and, indeed, why the state shouldn’t make 
available, as well, other packages that promote other legitimate public ends.53 
Indeed, the Council’s arguments against same-sex marriage miss the mark on several 
counts.  While the Council is certainly right that it is generally heterosexual relationships in 
which children will arrive unplanned, this is not a reason to exclude same-sex couples from 
receiving state privileges.  The Council argues that marriage is a superior family arrangement for 
both children who are unplanned as well as planned.  Many same-sex couples, like many 
heterosexual couples, plan to have children.  And the children of these same-sex parents, like the 
children of opposite-sex parents, are benefited by the stability of their parents’ relationships.  
Given this, it makes sense for the state to seek to stabilize these relationships with the same 
supports that the Council argues will work so well with opposite-sex couples.   
More than that, the state’s interest in ensuring that adults receive care also militates in 
favor of extending relationship privileges to same-sex couples.  While the Council criticizes 
those who seek to extend the state’s support beyond heterosexual marriage on the ground that 
 
53 While both heterosexuality and procreation were certainly conceived as central to traditional marriage, see, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605  (Mass. 1862) ( stating that “[t]he great object of marriage in a 
civilized and Christian community is to secure the existence and permanence of the family relation, and to insure the 
legitimacy of offspring”), at least the procreative purpose of marriage has been, if not quite eclipsed, then at least 
demoted from its spot of sole star billing to costar alongside the companionate and caretaking aspects of marriage.  
For example, older American cases restricted annulment for fraud in entering marriage to misrepresentations going 
to the “essentials” of marriage, conceived in terms of duties connected with consortium and fertility.  See, e.g., id. 
However, more recently, courts have broadened the fraud for which annulment will be granted more generally for 
misrepresentations critical to inducing the unplanning partner to marry.  As stated in Kober v. Kober:
[T]he fraud [required for annulment] need no longer “necessarily concern what is commonly called the 
essential of the marriage relation – the rights and duties connected with cohabitation and consortium 
attached by law to the marital status.  Any fraud is adequate which is “material to that degree that, had it 
not been practiced, the party deceived would not have consented to the marriage” and is “of such nature as 
to deceive an ordinarily prudent person.”  Although it is not enough to show merely that one partner 
married for money and the other was disappointed . . . and the decisions upon the subject of annulment 
have not always been uniform, there have been circumstances where misrepresentations of love and 
affection, with intention to make a home, were held sufficient . . .  
 
211 N.E.2d 817, 819 (N.Y. 1965); see also, 389 N.E.2d 1143 (Ill. 1979). 
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these policy advocates too narrowly focus on “such values as commitment, mutual support and 
the rest” in the absence of childrearing,54 the importance of mutual support and related goods 
offer powerful reasons for the state to privilege relationships that promote these goods, whether 
or not they further all the other values that the Council believes are crucial to the state’s 
protecting marriage.   
Finally, although the Council is right that women have, for a variety of biological and 
social reasons, been more vulnerable than men historically with respect to both unplanned 
pregnancies and childrearing, limiting marriage to heterosexual couples for this reason would be 
unwise.  To the contrary, to the extent that homosexual relationships do not replicate these same 
patterns of vulnerability, 55 the state has grounds to encourage same-sex relationships rather than 
deny them recognition and rights. Further, the Council’s insistence that marriage is an institution 
designed to protect vulnerable women flouts the Supreme Court’s counsel in cases such as 
Frontiero v. Richardson that the state should not rely on overbroad or outmoded sex 
stereotypes.56 
In advocating state support for marriage but not other relationship among adults, both 
Galston and the Council too quickly dismiss other principles important to liberal democracy that 
militate against the state privileging such a limited range of relationships.  The most important of 
these alternative principles is distribution based on need.  Because of economies of scale, adults 
in live-in relationships generally have an easier time financially than those who live alone.57 
54 COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 9, at 21. 
55 See Linda McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West’s Caring for Justice, 24 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 477, 510 (1999) (citing studies showing that generally lesbian couples do not organize their 
relationship on a provider-homemaker model).   
 
56 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-87(1973). 
 
57 See, e.g., ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE 
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Distributing resources to adults in relationships therefore is generally a regressive measure based 
on need.  Further, insofar as two-parent families have particular advantages that make them more 
conducive to rearing healthy, stable children than single-parent families, distributing privileges 
to dual-parent families may also be regressive based on need.58 As Judith Stacey argues, “The 
more eggs and raiments our society chooses to place in the family baskets of the married, the 
hungrier and shabbier will be the lives of the vast numbers of adults and dependents who, 
whether by fate, misfortune or volition will remain outside the gates.”59 
A clear recognition of the limits of both the state’s and individuals’ capacity to encourage 
marital relationships also cuts against distributing societal privileges based on marital status.  
Taking first limitations on the state’s capacity, it must be recognized that the state has only 
limited ability to help citizens acquire and sustain healthy caretaking relationships. While it can 
establish certain institutional preconditions and incentives for couples to make relationships 
work,60 ultimately whether or not healthy relationships will develop and be sustained has a great 
 
WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 150 (2001)(demonstrating that “two households are much more expensive than 
one”).   
 
58 The simple fact of distributing goods to families with children, however, is not regressive based on need.    As 
Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi demonstrate, having a child is now the best indicator of whether 
someone will end up in financial collapse.  In their words, “married couples with children are twice as likely as 
childless couples to file for bankruptcy.  They’re seventy-five percent more likely to be late paying their bills.  And 
they’re also far more likely to face foreclosure on their homes.”  ELIZABETH WARREN AND AMELIA WARREN TYAGI,
THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING (2003). 
59 Judith Stacey, Toward Equal Regard for Marriage and Other Imperfect Affiliations, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 331, 
344 (2003). Stacey adds: “In my view, this is an unacceptably steep and undemocratic social price for whatever 
marginal increases in marital stability might be achieved for those admitted to the charmed circle . . . ”  Id..
60 For example, poverty is significantly correlated with divorce, as are problems associated with poverty, such as 
homelessness and drug addiction.   Social scientists who study the phenomenon believe that some of the correlation 
between poverty and divorce is actually a causal relationship –  in other words, poverty leads to divorce. See 
generally Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Can We and Should We?, Address at the International Society of 
Family Law Conference (July 19-23, 2005)(on file with author).  Given this, an effective way for the state to 
increase the stability of intimate relationships may be indirectly through antipoverty measures and other institutional 
supports for the poor rather than through direct measures to promote institutions such as marriage.  Such indirect 
measures would also harmonize rather than conflict with the principle of distributing resources based on need.
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deal to do with characteristics of the individuals involved that are beyond the state’s reach to 
affect, and dumb luck – for example, who individuals happen to meet at what particular times.  
The state could, of course, still provide such sufficient financial incentives that people would 
enter into and remain in relationships in which they were miserable and in which little healthy 
caretaking occurred.  Doing so, however, would not further the goods that the state should be 
seeking to further.   
With respect to the issue of individuals’ own capacity to enter into and maintain 
relationships, it must be recognized that although personal attributes and behavior have some 
part to play in the success of an individual’s relationships, many factors that affect success are 
simply beyond the individual’s control.  For example, one partner may simply decide that he or 
she doesn’t love the other partner any more and leave, with no fault on the part of the other 
partner, and no change in the partner’s behavior.  Accordingly, considerations of fairness militate 
against distributing privileges based on the success of a person’s relationships, when this success 
has little relation to merit or effort and an inverse relation to need.   
In sum, Fineman, Warner, Galston and the Council on Family Law all reach the relatively 
black-and-white conclusions about the state’s position on marriage that each reaches because 
they ignore important goods and principles at stake with respect to this issue.  Considering all 
these goods and principles together yields a more complicated—but ultimately a more 
satisfying—picture of what the state’s role should be with respect to adults’ relationships. 
 
II. A Liberal Democratic Approach to Relationships Between Adults 
 
In Part I, I explored several prominent theoretical positions with respect to the state’s role 
in intimate relationships.  None of these positions, I argued, considered the complex array of 
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goods and principles at stake in these relationships.  In this Part, I lay out an approach that takes 
into account this array of important interests. 
To begin sorting out these matters, let me point out that there are actually two separate 
but related issues that must be considered with respect to the state’s approach to relationships.  
The first issue is whether the state should recognize relationships between adults for the purpose 
of assigning rights and responsibilities between these adults. The second is whether the state 
should privilege relationships between adults, in the sense that those who participate in these 
relationships should receive either benefits from or rights against the state or third parties that 
they would not otherwise receive.  I argue that both of these issues should be answered in the 
affirmative, although the first issue is an easier one to answer than the second.   
 
A.  State Recognition Of Adult-Adult Relationships 
When it comes to whether the state should recognize relationships between adults for the 
purpose of assigning rights and responsibilities between the parties, the answer seems to me to be 
clearly “yes.”  The interdependent nature of intimate relationships between adults, particularly 
when they are long-term, creates a series of issues regarding rights and responsibilities that are 
best addressed through laws that, at a minimum, establish a fair default position in the absence of 
an express agreement between parties to the relationship.  Without such default rules, this 
interdependence can create large inequities and injustices both during and, particularly, at the 
end of these relationships.  For the state to do otherwise, as Mary Shanley recognizes, would 
abandon the state’s interest in securing justice and equality in these relationships.61 
Martha Fineman, of course, argues that considerations of justice and equality dictate the 
opposite conclusion—state disengagement.  According to Fineman: 
 
61 Shanley, supra note 16, at 16. 
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If people want their relationships to have consequences, they should bargain for them, 
and this is as true with sexual affiliates as with others who interact in complex, ongoing 
interrelationships, such as employers and employees.  This would mean that sexual 
affiliates (formerly labeled husband and wife) would be regulated by the terms of their 
individualized agreements, with no special rules governing fairness and no unique review 
or monitoring of the negotiation process.62 
She asserts that the state’s withdrawal from regulating adult-adult relationships “would mean that 
we are taking gender equality seriously.”63 In suggesting that a contractual regime will result in 
fair and equal agreements between parties involved in intimate relationships, however, Fineman 
glosses over serious difficulties.  First she fails to take into account the ways in which those 
entering into a relationship based on affective ties may not be looking out after their own 
interests in opposition to the other person’s (and that the state may not want to encourage them to 
be solely self-regarding).  As a result, a “sexual affiliate” may agree to an unfair contract.  
Furthermore, the course of lives and relationships are often so difficult to predict that contracts 
entered into ex ante may not fairly and justly resolve what occurs ex post. In addition, in a 
regime of contract, those in a weaker bargaining position –  traditionally women – will likely 
negotiate less favorable terms for themselves that will lead to inequality both in the course of the 
relationship and also when and if it ends.    
And in this regime, even those who negotiate unfavorable contracts may be the lucky 
ones compared to those who negotiate no contracts.  For some, this will be because they cannot 
afford a lawyer; for others, this will be because the motivation to express one’s love publicly, 
which many would say is their motivation to enter marriage,64 would not similarly impel them to 
 
62 FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 134. 
 
63 Id.  
64 See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 798 N.E.2d 941, 954-55 (Mass. 2003) (quoting Griswold v. 
Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human 
being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.  It is 
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enter into a contract to protect themselves against their partner.  If and when these relationships 
end, the partners would have no contract claims against one another.  Existing, albeit imperfect, 
status-based protections that are currently available to those divorcing, such as the right to 
equitable distribution of property and alimony, would be nonexistent in such a regime.   This 
would particularly hurt those who devote more energy and care to the relationship than to 
financial pursuits – again, likely women – since they would have no automatic claim to income 
earned by their partners through the joint efforts of the family.65 
A regime in which the state recognized relationships among adults for the purpose of 
apportioning rights and obligations among them therefore furthers the ends of fairness and 
justice.  Of course, such rights and obligations could be assigned to couples based on the 
functional status of their relationship, without the state having to provide civil avenues to 
formalize these relationships ex ante. For example, the rights and responsibilities that the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution66 now seek to apply to 
unmarried cohabitants could, in an era in which civil marriage and other formalized 
commitments between adults were eliminated, be applied to all couples.  Under such an 
approach, what would matter in assigning such rights would be the couple’s functional 
characteristics – how long they lived together, whether they had children together, etc. – rather 
than whether they had formalized their relationship.  For example, more property sharing might 
 
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not 
commercial or social projects.”). 
 
65 It might be argued, however, that although some individuals who enter into conjugal relationships may fare worse 
in the event of a break-up, if status based marriages were eliminated, many other individuals would fare better 
because, in the absence of such recognition from the state, they would cease to enter into conjugal relationships.  
And certainly Fineman and other commentators have suggested that most women would fare better if they avoided 
entering into marriage or marriage-like relationships with men altogether.  Whether or not this is the case, my strong 
hunch is that ending civil recognition will have little effect on the numbers of people who enter into conjugal 
relationships – they will simply do so without the imprimatur of the state, or its protections. 
 
66 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2001). 
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be required of couples who lived together for longer periods of time than couples who lived 
together for shorter periods, regardless of whether the couple had made some formal 
commitment to stay together.   
In my view, however, eliminating a civil route for formalizing relationships would be a 
mistake for two reasons.  First, this formalization helps to identify the intent of its members and 
their own understandings with respect to the intended primacy and permanency of the 
relationship.  And surely such understandings should be relevant to determining the default rules 
that apply to the particular relationship.  For example, a commitment to a permanent relationship, 
such as the entry into marriage serves today, should be pertinent to the state’s determination of 
how long income should be redistributed between parties who have separated. Second, as the 
Council of Families recognizes, the state’s making available a route through which citizens can 
formally commit to the permanency and depth of their relationship serves the state’s goal of 
increasing the stability of adult caretaking relationships.  Such commitments increase the 
likelihood that those participants who face tough times will try harder to weather the difficulty 
with their partners.67 
B.  State Privileging Of (Some) Adult-Adult Relationships 
I have argued that the state should recognize relationships between adults and impose, at 
the least, default rights and responsibilities among participants in such relationships for the 
purpose of seeking to ensure equality and fairness.  The issue of whether the state may and 
should seek to privilege such relationships over others is a much tougher issue for a liberal 
democracy.  In my view, the answer should be “yes” because of the goods that these 
relationships further.  These privileges, however, must be limited in particular ways since they 
 
67 See Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy – Balancing the Individual 
and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 476-84 (1983). 
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raise tensions among important liberal goods and values.  Part of the challenge of a more robust 
liberalism that recognizes a richer diversity of goods must be to seek a course of action that 
ameliorates the tensions among these varied goods.  In what follows, I set out four principles for 
the state’s treatment of adults’ relationships that, together, seek to accomplish this purpose. 
 
1.  Freedom to enter into consensual relationships 
 
First, liberalism’s great respect for individuals’ forming and carrying out their own life 
plans requires that the state allow individuals the freedom to engage – or not engage – in 
consensual relationships with others.  The right to determine one’s own personal relationships is 
central to liberalism’s respect for individual self-determination.  The fact that liberalism was 
born out of fear of tyranny, as Judith Shklar points out, 68 strongly militates against the state 
decreeing that some consensual relationships are permissible and others are not.  John Stuart 
Mill’s counsel that society benefits from allowing different “experiments of living” to flourish 
also supports the state’s ensuring that such freedom exists.69 Under this principle, for example, a 
citizen whose vision of the good life is to have sexual relationships with as many other citizens 
as possible should be able to fulfill that vision without interference by the state (barring issues 
such as public health concerns), regardless of whether the majority’s own private views of 
morality condemn such action.    
 
2.  Encouragement of (a broad range of) long-term caretaking  
 relationships 
 
Second, although the liberal state must tolerate all consensual relationships, it need not 
give all such relationships a level playing field.  It is true, as Fineman and Warner argue, that the 
 
68 See Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE  MORAL LIFE 37 (N.L. Rosenblum, ed. 1989). 
 
69 See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER (John Gray ed., 1991). 
 
28
liberal democratic state should not favor some relationships over others based on citizens’ 
private notions of morality.  It can and should, however, seek to support relationships that further 
important public goods in which the liberal state has a legitimate interest.  Among the most 
important of these is caretaking.  Without minimizing the harm that can occur in relationships 
between adults, or ignoring the sex inequality that tends to mark heterosexual relationships, the 
crux of the matter is that dependency is an inevitable fact of life for adults as well as children, 
and a liberal state must contend with that fact.  Because of its interest in the health, well-being, 
and dignity of its citizens, the liberal state has a vital interest in the success of long-term 
relationships, and should provide these relationships with the institutional support that will help 
them flourish.   
Given that the state’s interest is in caretaking, the category of relationships that the state 
has an interest in supporting is considerably broader than the set of couples who are now 
formally married.   The state has an interest in supporting all long-term intimate relationships in 
which caretaking occurs, including relationships of couples who are not necessarily 
monogamous, or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, those whose relationships are not sexual.  
By the same token, the state also has an interest in supporting caretaking in family groupings that 
involve more than two adults.70 Thus, the state has valid reasons to support all of the following 
horizontal relationships involving caretaking: a couple of elderly sisters who live together and 
take care of one another, a non-monogamous homosexual couple, a commune of five adults who 
live together with their children, and a heterosexual married couple. 
 
70 There may be administrative rather than theoretical reasons to limit the number of persons that the state should 
recognize.  There is, however, no reason that two persons should necessarily be the limit. 
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3. Limits on the privileges available to  long-term caretaking  
relationships 
Third, with all that said, promoting the health and stability of horizontal relationships is 
only one goal that a flourishing liberal democracy should pursue, and only one of many 
principles that should affect the state’s decision-making.  State distribution of privileges in favor 
of these relationships therefore has to be weighed against alternative principles of distribution, 
including distribution based on need.  As I pointed out before, considerations of need will often 
conflict with distributing privileges to adults in long-term relationships.  Further, the recognition 
of the limits on the state’s and individuals’ abilities to ensure the existence and stability of 
relationships must also be factored into the state’s family policy. 
These considerations should cause the state to limit the privileges that support these 
relationships in two specific ways.  First, the state’s seeking to aid caretaking relationships 
between adults cannot undercut the state’s responsibility to ensure that all its citizens have the 
means and opportunity to pursue dignified lives.   This means, at a minimum, as Martha Fineman 
argues, that a just society should seek to deliver basic social goods such as health care to 
everyone in society, rather than based on family membership.   Insofar as the state distributes 
these goods based on marital status, it neglects its most basic responsibilities.   
 Second, the state should limit privileges for relationships to those tied to the specific 
public good in which the state has a legitimate interest – for example, caretaking, or sex 
equality.71 Singling out families for more generalized favorable treatment – while it might still 
further the goal of supporting families –  stands in tension with principles of fairness among all 
citizens, both those within and those not in such families, particularly insofar as it redistributes 
 
71 See also FINAL REPORT: BEYOND CONJUGALITY, LAW COMM’N OF CANADA (2004), available at 
http://www.lcc.gc.ca/about/conjugality_toc-en.asp (last visited March 15, 2006).  
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economic resources to those who are, on average, better off.  Under this principle, the state could 
allow caretaking leaves from work or special immigration privileges for the partners of citizens, 
but not general tax breaks for those in caretaking relationships that are unrelated to the extra 
expenses incurred in caretaking.  Thus the state would have little justification for funnelling 
general economic support to those in adult-adult relationships, given that these adults, on 
average, do better financially due to the economies of scale of living together.  In contrast, 
economic redistribution to caretaker-dependent relationships could be better justified by the 
consideration of the cost to caretakers of caring for dependents, including the interruption from 
working continuously in the paid work force.   
One important way in which the state can legitimately foster relationships among adults 
that conform with this principle is to provide a civil route through which adults can formalize 
their commitment to others.  As Bruce Hafen notes, formal commitments increase the likelihood 
that a relationship will last.72 They also serve as an expressive vehicle for the state to announce 
its support for stable caretaking relationships without redistributing tangible privileges in favor 
of such relationships and, hence, away from those who might need them more.  The state’s 
endorsing such civil commitments is still not, of course, without cost to those who do not enter 
them: to the extent that the state endorses such commitments, those who do not enter into them 
may feel a lack of societal respect, or even societal disapprobation.  In my view, however, the 
benefits that such formalization yields in terms of the stability of these relationships, given the 
importance of such relationships, still outweighs the costs of this potential stigmatization. 
 
72 See Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy – Balancing the Individual 
and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 476-84 (1983). 
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4.  Guarding against injury to other important goods  
Fourth, in privileging caretaking relationships between adults, the state must also seek to 
remedy the negative consequences to public goods associated with these relationships.  Three of 
these possible consequences bear particular attention: 1) increased gender inequality, 2) 
increased economic inequality, and 3) the possibility that close caretaking relationships will 
cause their participants to turn away from civic life, instead of serving as a springboard to 
healthy civic engagement.  I discuss each in turn. 
 
a.  Sex inequality 
Any proposals that the state should promote intimate caretaking relationships must deal 
with the fact that heterosexual relationships, as well as the institution of marriage, have been 
deeply intertwined with women’s continued gender inequality.  Leaving current political realities 
aside, the state might, of course, deal with this troubling association by privileging only those 
long-term caretaking relationships that do not involve heterosexual relationships.  Alternatively, 
and far more palatable politically, the state could privilege heterosexual relationships along with 
other relationships at the same time that it seeks to increase the equality within these 
relationships.   
One way to pursue this latter goal would be for the state to adopt policies that encouraged 
the shared caretaking of children by their parents, since so much gender inequality is associated 
with women’s assuming the greater portion of childrearing responsibilities.73 To accomplish this 
goal, the state could adopt models of public support for caretaking that encourage men to take an 
equal role.   For example, requiring that employers adopt family leave policies that can be taken 
 
73 See Katharine Bartlett, Brigitte M. Bodenheimer Memorial Lecture On The Family: Saving the Family from the 
Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 844-45 (1998). 
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by parents sharing childcare between them, rather than policies that are limited to full-time 
caregivers, would encourage shared caretaking, as would flex-time, and allowing both parents of 
very young children to work somewhat fewer hours without sacrificing their jobs.  Schools, too, 
should play a role in this endeavor, teaching children that both fathers and mothers can have 
equal roles in nurturing their children, and helping them to understand the importance of these 
caretaking tasks.  In Anita Shreve’s words, “the old home-economics courses that used to teach 
girls how to cook and sew might give way to the new home economics: teaching girls and boys 
how to combine work and parenting.”74 
b. Economic inequality 
Second, with respect to economic equality, the state’s encouraging tighter family ties runs 
an increased risk that wealth will be more tightly held within particular families’ hands, and, 
therefore, that there will be more disparities of wealth and, consequently, opportunity across 
families.  What this threat to equality calls for, however, is not state efforts to loosen family ties, 
but rather efforts to lessen the disparities of wealth and opportunity that result from these ties.  
Lessening these disparities requires that the state seek to ensure that all citizens have the 
financial means and education to ensure (at the very least) some basic threshold of opportunity, 
even when their families cannot provide this without aid.  It also means, at the other end of the 
income spectrum, that the state should seek to reduce, although probably not eliminate, 
disparities in wealth continuing between generations.  As Michael Walzer argues, there are 
significant reasons to allow family members to express their love through bequests to family 
members, as well as significant reasons to tax these bequests for reasons of equality and funding 
 
74 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 177 (1989) (quoting ANITA SHREVE, REMAKING 
MOTHERHOOD 237 (1987)). 
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legitimate state expenditures.75 As Walzer concludes, the state should moderate between these 
goals by giving some weight to both when determining the extent of taxation of such gifts. 
 
c.  Families as a respite, not an island 
 The state should also seek to encourage familial relationships to serve as a source of 
support, but not be islands unto themselves.   As Michelle Barrett and Mary McIntosh point out, 
the nuclear family, with its ideal of self-sufficiency, can cause family members to focus so 
exclusively on their families that it interferes with the vigorous public life that a healthy liberal 
democracy requires.76 To counter the tendency for family members to treat their families as an 
island, the state should seek to support the caretaking relationships associated with the nuclear 
family at the same time that it seeks at least some deprivatization of this form.  The pattern of 
childrearing in which parents have sole responsibility for childcare inside a private home isolates 
children and caretaking parents from the larger community.  In privileging caretaking 
relationships, the state should seek to construct institutional arrangements that incorporate 
parents and dependents into the life of the community and share caretaking responsibilities 
within the community.  Tax subsidies for co-housing developments, in which some cooking and 
childcare are performed cooperatively, and supports for childcare cooperatives, are two measures 
by which the state can pursue this end. 
 
75 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 128 (1990)(“But surely 
the gift is one of the finer expressions of ownership as we know it.  And so long as they act within their sphere, we 
have every reason to respect those men and women who give their money away to persons they love or to causes to 
which they are committed, even if they make distributive outcomes unpredictable and uneven.”). 
 
76 MICHELE BARRETT AND MARY MCINTOSH, THE ANTI-SOCIAL FAMILY 51-52 (1991). 
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III.  Civil Partnership or Proliferation of Families?  
The most difficult issue with respect to how the state should treat adult’s long-term 
caretaking relationships is not, in my view, whether or not the state should accord some civil 
status to these relationships, or even the issue of whether the state should provide subsidies to 
caretaking relationships.  As I have said, in my view the answer to each of these questions is 
“yes,” in large part because of the importance of caretaking to society.  The most difficult issue 
is whether all such horizontal relationships should be categorized together for purposes of public 
support under a banner such as “domestic partnership,” or whether they should be categorized 
separately according to the general type of relationship at issue.  In the latter case, the state 
would presumably retain a civil status for conjugal relationships such as marriage (which, out of 
justice and fairness, as well as for the goods associated with them, would need to be expanded to 
same-sex couples), but also recognize other forms of adult-adult relationships, such as domestic 
partnerships between friends who cohabitate.  This approach, however, runs the risk that marital 
relationships will continue to be perceived as superior to other relationships and 
disproportionately assigned privileges. 
Grouping all adult-adult relationships into a single legal status has the advantage of 
guarding against the possibility that any particular subcategory of relationship, namely, marriage, 
would be unfairly privileged as against other horizontal relationships.  In addition, clustering 
different types of horizontal relationships together into the same legal category would send a 
strong message that marriage occupies no paramount place in the hierarchy.   
There are several downsides to this strategy, however.  First, treating these relationships 
as a single category would keep the state from tailoring the particular obligations and benefits 
assigned to that status to the type of caretaking relationship at issue.  For example, when a child 
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is born to or adopted by one of the parties within a conjugal relationship, it makes sense to 
accord a presumption of parenthood and right to adopt to the other partner.  There is less reason 
to accord such a presumption in a non-conjugal caretaking relationship, however.  The same is 
true for inheritance rights: as a default matter, it makes sense to assign a presumption that 
conjugal partners intend their partner to inherit (in the absence of agreements to the contrary), 
since most individuals in such relationships leave their estates to their partners.  It may make less 
sense to apply this presumption to other types of long-term caretaking relationships. With that 
said, the state could choose to divide relationships into categories for the purpose of delineating 
rights between the partners, but to use a single category for purposes of assigning state support. 
Second, although moving away from the category of marriage has the benefit of 
eliminating marriage as the privileged category, it has the related disadvantage that much of the 
positive cultural resonance associated with marriage – the notion that the institution is a serious, 
long-term bond of commitment based on love between two people who come together and take 
one another permanently as family – will also be lost.77 To the extent that laws have an 
expressive force to which citizens respond, eliminating marriage would weaken the resolve of 
those in relationships to work through rough periods.  It could also dissuade those who would 
otherwise have married from entering into domestic partnerships, since such partnerships do not 
have the same cultural resonance that swearing one’s love through marriage does.  This could 
leave many of those made vulnerable by relationships without legal protection.   
 
77 See supra note 62.  
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At the level of theory, in my view, there is no clear winner between these two alternatives 
– each has its own set of benefits and costs.78 At the level of political reality, though, the popular 
ideology (not to mention the $50 billion a year wedding industry)79 is so invested in the value of 
marriage that eliminating civil marriage is well nigh impossible.   As a result, those who seek to 
topple marriage from its pedestal as the preferred form of family and to increase the equity 
among different forms of relationships would likely do better to focus their attention on 
decentering marriage by proliferating other categories of status relationships among adults, rather 
than seeking to eliminate marriage as a civil status and replacing it by a civil partnership 
category.80 This strategy of broadening the categories of relationships that receive legal 
protections and support, and distributing a subset of the bundle of rights now received by 
marriage among these different relationships,81 is not only the most pragmatic course to take 
given existing political realities, but a course that offers significant promise in furthering the 
goods that a liberal democracy needs to flourish.  Disaggregating the privileges awarded based 
on the good at issue also helps deconstruct the monolithic notion of “The Family,” and the 
orthodoxy surrounding it.  This approach makes it clear that there are many kinds of 
relationships that contribute many different public goods, and that no one-size-fits-all family is 
the ideal.   
 
78 As a result of the difficulty of this issue, Mary Shanley recently shifted positions, first arguing that the state 
should continue to support civil marriage, see SHANLEY, supra note 16, and more recently arguing that the state 
should discard civil marriage and treat all horizontal relationships as domestic partnerships.  See id. 
79 Dina ElBoghdady, For Love and Money; Amid Economic Sickness, Bridal Industry Radiates Health, WASH.
POST, May 25, 2003, at F1. 
 
80 See Judith Stacey, The New Family Value Crusaders, THE NATION, July 25, 1994; McClain, supra note 40, at 391, 
401-02. 
 
81 See Iris Marion Young, Reflections on the Family in the Age of Murphy Brown: On Gender, Justice, and 
Sexuality, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN 
POLITICAL THEORY 258 (Nancy J. Hirschmann and Christine DiStefano eds., 1996); James DiFonzo, Unbundling 
Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 65-66 (2003). 
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IV.   Difficult Cases:  Encouraging the Two-Parent Family and Encouraging Marriage  
 
I have argued that the state has a legitimate interest in preferring two-parent (or more) 
families over single-parent families where children are involved.  However, the thorny issue of 
how the state should seek to encourage two-parent families merits additional discussion.  As I 
have argued elsewhere,82 the state has a duty to ensure that children have the caretaking and 
other resources necessary to support their well-being and develop their capabilities.  This duty 
exists, whether or not the state believes that parents have made a wise choice about their family 
form, and even if the state fears that ensuring that today’s children have necessary resources will 
send the wrong signals about better and worse family forms and therefore hurt future children; 
the duty to support the existing children is paramount.  For these reasons, it is illegitimate for the 
state to withhold welfare benefits to low-income families based on the mother’s having 
additional children out if wedlock, if doing so would deprive the children in these families of 
necessary resources.   
Above this required threshold of support, however, the state does have legitimate reasons 
to adopt measures that encourage two parent families.   In doing so, however, the state should 
seek to harmonize the important liberal goods at stake.  In other words, the state’s goal should be 
to construct policies that avoid zero-sum situations in which furthering some goods operates to 
the detriment of others.  Developing such policies will, however, require careful attention to the 
ways in which relevant goods may conflict.  By this criterion, the state’s seeking to further two-
parent families by awarding them economic resources not awarded to single-parent families is a 
peculiarly bad tool to harmonize these goods.  Not only would doing so keep resources from the 
 
82 Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman’s The Autonomy Myth, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 1285 (2005). 
 
38
very families who need them most, it also risks stigmatizing the very children who are most 
vulnerable.  Far better would be measures that do not pose such a stark tradeoff among goods.   
Thus the state would do better, for example, to achieve this end through job training programs 
and educational subsidies for youths who are at risk of becoming parents, since studies show that 
increasing the prospects for young adults’ future makes it significantly less likely that they will 
bear children while they are young and single.83 Such programs do not pit the important interests 
of current children against the important interests of future children.  
The state should deal in a similar manner with proposals to shore up the institution of 
marriage (or whatever categories of adult-adult relationships that the state retains).  Proponents 
of marriage have proposed a number of policies recently to strengthen marriage, including 
making divorce more difficult through returning to fault divorce laws, adopting covenant 
marriage provisions, premarital counseling, and even awarding bonuses for marriages where no 
pre-marital abortions occurred.84 In choosing policies to strengthen the health and permanency 
of horizontal relationships, the state should here, too, seek to avoid policies that require large 
tradeoffs between important goods.  In this light, tightening up divorce laws through a return to 
fault divorce, despite furthering the state’s interest in promoting marriage, severely infringes on 
citizens’ autonomy interests.85 The state would therefore do better to adopt proposals such as 
 
83 MARION WRIGHT EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 88 (1988). 
 
84 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2000 & Supp. 2004); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-801 to 9-11-811 
(2002 & Supp. 2003);La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272 to 9:276 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (covenant marriage 
provisions).See also Missouri House Bill 1917, LR # 3769-01 (1999)(proposing that couples who marry after 
attaining the age of 21, without having had any children or (in the woman’s case) any premarital abortions, and 
having tested negative for STD’s, be paid $1000 from a fund, which would be raised by assessing a $1000 fee 
against parties whose actions provided the grounds for a divorce).  
 
85 Covenant marriage laws, in which individuals getting married can choose whether or not heightened standards 
will apply at divorce, pose less of a conflict among important goods. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§25-901 to 25-906 (2000 
& Supp. 2004); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-801 to 9-11-811 (2002 & Supp. 2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272 to 
9:276 (2000 & Supp. 2005)).  Given the small number of couples who choose to enter into covenant marriage where 
it is available, though, as well as the problems with requiring parties to remain in a marriage that one party wants to 
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pre-marital counseling requirements that would avoid this stark tradeoff of goods.  Further, given 
that women more often seek divorces than men, as Katharine Bartlett points out,86 the state could 
usefully support such relationships by encouraging men to be better partners through assuming 
an equal share of housework and carework.87 Such measures would infringe less on individual’s 
autonomy than stricter divorce laws and, at the same time, increase sex equality. 
In determining the measures that the state should take to further such relationships, it is 
important to keep in mind the limits of the state’s institutional competence to deal with the 
complexities of these relationships.  The state can make it more difficult for individuals to get 
out of marriage.  It cannot, however, keep affection and caretaking alive within such 
relationships.88 As I argued before, this recognition of the state’s inherent lack of institutional 
capacity, as well as limits on citizens’ own capacities in this area, should cause the state to limit 
benefits awarded to families out of concern for individual fairness.  It should also cause the state 
to investigate means to encourage alternative caretaking networks for those who are not, either 
 
exit, the state would be wise to seek alternative policies. In Louisiana, two percent; in Arizona, 0.25 percent; and in 
Arkansas, only 71 out of approximately 38,000 marrying couples elected the covenant marriage. SCOTT 
DREWIANKA, CIVIL UNIONS AND COVENANT MARRIAGE: THE ECONOMICS OF REFORMING MARITAL INSTITUTIONS 
(2003).  
86 Bartlett cites figures from a 1986 study which indicate that women initiate divorce in 62 to 67 percent of cases. 
Bartlett, supra note 65, at 842 n.135.  A more recent study gives approximately the same result, placing the figure at 
70 percent. Margaret Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, ‘These Boots Are Made for Walking’: Why Most Divorce Filers 
Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 127-28 (2000).  
87 See Bartlett, supra note 65, at 842. More recent data indicates that women still do an average of 17.5 hours of 
housework per week, while men do an average of 10.  JAMES A. SWEET AND LARRY L. BUMPASS, CENTER FOR 
DEMOGRAPHY AND ECOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILIES AND 
HOUSEHOLDS - WAVES 1 AND 2: DATA DESCRIPTION AND DOCUMENTATION, available at 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh/home.htm (last visited December 20, 2005).   
 
88 The difficulties associated with the state’s promotion of marriage, for example, were made eminently clear in  
President G.W. Bush’s recent plan to promote marriage for women on welfare.  Despite the administrations $1.5 
billion initiative, the administration had no clear plan for how states might successfully promote marriage once 
Wade Horn, the top official at Health and Human Services, withdrew his earlier proposal to award those who 
married with cash bonuses. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Editorial, Let Them Eat Wedding Cake, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 
2004, §4, at 13.   
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through chance or choice, members of intimate relationships, such as “mothers houses,” where 
single parents can raise their children more communally, or the types of informal networks 
among friends that helped provide caretaking for men in the gay community stricken with AIDS 
in San Francisco at the height of the epidemic.   
 
Conclusion 
 Given how contentious a legal and political issue marriage has become, it should not be 
surprising that the state’s position with respect to marriage and other relationships among adults 
implicates so many, and such conflicting, goods and principles important to a liberal democracy.  
For this reason, determining the appropriate stance of the state to these relationships cannot be 
accomplished by looking to only one or two of the relevant factors at stake.  To do so, as Indian 
folklore tells us, would be to take one part of the elephant for the whole. 
 
